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Abstract 
Protracted crisis situations often last for years or 
decades, and derive from a complex mix of factors 
such as violent conflict, natural disasters, poverty, 
natural resources scarcity, institutional fragility, 
political instability, and limited economic opportu-
nity. As they feature both emergency needs and 
structural vulnerabilities, protracted crises require 
a comprehensive approach that brings different 
actors and policy communities together under sin-
gle political leadership, focusing on a common 
objective of paving the way to stability, resilience 
and development. This article addresses the ques-
tion of whether the European Union (EU) is well 
positioned to respond comprehensively to such 
protracted crises. It explores a diversity of EU 
financing instruments as these are ‘enablers’ for the 
EU comprehensive approach, also taking into 
account the role of EU Member States. In fact, the 
EU has a wide array of financial instruments and 
mechanisms available to address protracted crises 
and to pursue different objectives across short – 
and longer-term time horizons. However, their 
comprehensive use is seriously constrained by the 
fragmentation of EU decision-making, strategic 
incoherence, and overlapping instrument man-
dates. EU institutions have made serious efforts to 
overcome such limitations, including through a 
harmonization of concepts and strategies. Further-
more, mechanisms for coordination and informa-
tion exchange at the political and operational levels 
allow for collaborative responses. However, many 
of these technical solutions can only bring limited 
results in the absence of clear political leadership 
driving EU external action.
Resumo
O Empenhamento da União Europeia em Crises 
Estruturais: no Caminho de uma Abordagem 
Abrangente? 
Situações de crise estrutural prolongam-se por décadas e 
resultam de uma combinação de fatores como conflitos 
violentos, desastres naturais, pobreza, escassez de recur-
sos naturais, fragilidade institucional e limitadas opor-
tunidades económicas. Estas crises concatenam necessi-
dades urgentes com vulnerabilidades estruturais, 
requerendo uma abordagem abrangente que reúna dife-
rentes atores e comunidades políticas sob uma única 
liderança, centrada num objetivo comum promotor da 
estabilidade, resiliência e desenvolvimento. Este artigo 
questiona se a União Europeia (UE) se encontra bem 
posicionada para responder de uma forma holística a cri-
ses estruturais, examinando de uma forma detalhada os 
instrumentos financeiros da UE e considerando o papel 
específico dos Estados-membros. Nele se observa a pre-
sença de um vasto conjunto de instrumentos e mecanis-
mos disponíveis, que permitem à União Europeia gerir 
uma variedade de desafios associados às crises estrutu-
rais e prosseguir uma diversidade de objetivos, em hori-
zontes temporais de curta e longa duração. Contudo, a 
sua abrangência encontra-se limitada pela fragmentação 
dos processos de decisão da União, pela sua incoerência 
estratégica e pela sobreposição de mandatos. As institui-
ções europeias têm desenvolvido sérios esforços para 
ultrapassar estas limitações, incluindo a harmonização 
de conceitos e estratégias, de mecanismos de coordenação 
e a troca de informação ao nível político e operacional, 
permitindo o desenvolvimento de respostas colaborati-
vas. Porém as soluções técnicas apenas geram resultados 
limitados, em particular na ausência de uma clara lide-
rança política capaz de orientar a ação externa da União 
como um todo.
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Introduction
Violent conflict, in the form of crisis and of protracted crisis1, will continue to be a 
foreign and development policy challenge globally in the coming years. Because of 
their complicated nature and the varying length of potential intervention, pro-
tracted crises are especially challenging for the European Union (EU) and its com-
prehensive approach. OCHA figures have shown that the number of people relying 
on humanitarian aid has nearly doubled in the past ten years (OCHA, 2014), while 
the share of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) has doubled since 2000, 
from 5% then to 10% today (Maxwell, 2016). Moreover, the average length of an 
OCHA humanitarian appeal has now become seven years, indicating that humani-
tarian interventions are becoming increasingly long-term engagements. Among 
OECD Member States, 89 percent of total humanitarian funding is directed to pro-
tracted crises, including long-running relief programmes in countries like Sudan, 
Somalia or Ethiopia (Grogan, Strohmeyer, 2015).At the same time, crisis situations 
are often not just disruptions from the ‘normal path’ of development; they derive 
from a complex mix of factors such as violent conflict, natural disasters, poverty, 
natural resource scarcity, institutional fragility, political instability and limited eco-
nomic opportunity, resulting in protracted crisis situations that last for years, if not 
decades. Most countries that are long-term recipients of humanitarian aid feature 
emergency needs but also structural poverty and weak state institutions that do not 
provide social safety nets to their citizens.2 
Between 2000 and 2014, forced displacement has also become much longer term, on 
average. At the end of 2014, two-thirds of all refugees (12.9 million people) were 
stuck in protracted displacement situations of at least three years, and half of the 
refugees had been displaced for at least ten years (Crawford, Cosgrave, Haysom 
and Walicki, 2015). Traditionally, conceptual thinking and responses to crisis situa-
tions have taken a linear approach, where responsibilities are handed over in a 
sequence: from relief actors, to reconstruction and rehabilitation, and eventually to 
long-term development. This has led to a more comprehensive understanding of 
crises over the recent years, recognising also their long-term nature, their multidi-
mensional character, and a need to address needs often simultaneously. Such pro-
tracted crises require that donors address not only urgent needs e.g. through 
humanitarian aid or short-term stabilisation, but also the underlying political and 
1 This paper defines protracted crises as ‘complex (political) situations, usually comprising ele-
ments, or a mix, of (violent) conflict, natural disaster, poverty, scarce (natural) resources, insti-
tutional fragility and limited economic opportunity resulting in enduring or recurrent crisis, 
sometimes lasting years or decades.’ (Bennett, 2015, p. 6; Scott, 2015). 
2 Of the 30 countries categorised as long-term recipients of humanitarian aid during the past 15 
years, 25 were in 2013 also classified as fragile states (Swithern, 2014).
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development challenges through more structural engagement in recovery and 
reconstruction, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, disaster risk reduction, and 
sustainable development. Such a comprehensive approach would not only meet 
urgent needs, but also reduce them in the long term. Comprehensiveness, in this 
context, means that different actors and policy communities would act under a 
single political leadership so that their respective actions are adding up to a com-
mon objective of paving the way to stability, resilience and development. 
Drawing on a literature review and a number of interviews conducted with key 
stakeholders (EU officials and NGO representatives), this article asks whether the 
European Union is well positioned to respond comprehensively to such protracted 
crises. Does it have the pertinent instruments, and how does such an EU compre-
hensive approach materialise? We offer a detailed look into the EU financing instru-
ments, taking into account the specific role of EU Member States as well. This is 
illustrated with examples of situations of (protracted) crises where the EU has 
engaged. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a concise overview 
of the instruments that the EU has at its disposal in protracted crises, as well as their 
added value3. Section 3 offers a ‘reality check’ to analyse and explain the limitations 
and challenges that the EU is facing when putting a comprehensive approach 
into practice. Section 4, finally, discusses how the EU has taken technical efforts 
to improve comprehensiveness, despite its institutional design and political 
dynamics. It also points at some areas for potential improvement. 
EU Instruments and Mechanisms to Engage in Protracted Crisis Situations
The EU has a variety of instruments that can be used in situations of protrac- 
ted crisis. They are designed for specific policies and geographical areas, and 
managed by different institutional actors – notably by different Directorate- 
-Generals in the European Commission. An overview of these instruments is 
given in Table 1. 
Like most donors, the EU has a dedicated instrument for humanitarian aid, man-
aged by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Pro-
tection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO). It allows the EU to pro-
vide quick and short-term support to humanitarian programmes for a maximum 
duration of 24 months, based on annual needs assessments, and in accordance 
with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality. 
3 Rather than providing a full, methodological analysis of all EU instruments, it focuses on those 
that are important for situations of (protracted) crisis. Our focus on EU financing instruments 
pays limited attention to the tools and instruments in the realm of Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy, which operate according to different, 
more intergovernmental, governance structures. 
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For instance, it is estimated that the Syrian conflict has already left 13.5 million people 
in need of humanitarian assistance inside the country alone. Recent OCHA figures 
indicated that 6.6 million Syrians are internally displaced, and more than 4.5 million 
were forced to flee to neighbouring countries or regions (OCHA, 2016). Through its 
humanitarian aid instrument, the EU has mobilised a total of EUR 445 million in 2016 
to address needs inside Syria as well as of Syrian refugees and host communities in 
neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2016a).The mandate of EU humani-
tarian aid extends beyond the core humanitarian task of lifesaving operations in 
emergencies to also include relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises, short-
term rehabilitation and reconstruction action, and disaster preparedness. For instance, 
while the bulk of EU humanitarian aid in 2014 responded to the most severe huma- 
Table 1 – Overview of EU instruments and mechanisms
Financing instrument 
(budget allocation for 2014-2020)
Main objective
Humanitarian Aid Instrument 
(EUR 7.1 billion) 
Providing humanitarian aid based on annual stra-
tegies and in accordance with humanitarian prin-
ciples; focuses on life-saving relief in emergencies 
as well in longer-lasting crises, and rehabilitation 
and reconstruction
Development Cooperation 
Instrument (EUR 19.6 billion) 
Multiannual development cooperation program-
mes with a focus on poverty reduction and sustai-
nable development.
Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (EUR 2.3 
billion) 
Non-programmable short- to medium-term ope-
rations in response to (emerging) crisis situations; 
programmed longer-term peacebuilding and con-
flict prevention interventions.
European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (EUR 15.4 billion)
Long-term cooperation to advance towards an 
area of shared prosperity and good neighbourli-
ness in the European Neighbourhood.
Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (EUR 11.7 billion)
Provides support to (potential) candidate EU 
Member States in adopting the EU acquis, based 
on seven-year multiannual action programmes.
EU Trust Funds (ad hoc 
contributions from EU 
instruments and other donors)
Trust Funds for specific thematic priorities or cri-
sis or post-crisis situations; function according to 
their own governance structures.
11th European Development Fund 
(EUR 30.5 billion, of which EUR 
740 for the African Peace Facility
Multiannual development cooperation program-
mes with a focus on poverty reduction and sustai-
nable development. Contains the Africa Peace 
Facility to foster peace, stability and security in 
Africa, providing the basis for long-term sustaina-
ble development.
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nitarian emergencies such as Syria, Iraq or South Sudan, 17 percent of ECHO’s 
funding was directed to ‘forgotten’ protracted crises, such as the Sahrawi refugee 
crisis in Algeria or the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh (European Commis-
sion, COM, 2015).However, DG ECHO uses short-term planning and financing per-
spectives, and it confronts legal EU restrictions on the funding of local actors in 
beneficiary countries. This makes EU humanitarian aid not suited to provide longer-
term capacity-building support and to take a structural approach to protracted crises. 
The EU has a number of development and international cooperation instruments 
available to address longer-term development and capacity-building, the most 
notable of which are the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF), the European Neighbourhood Fund (ENI), and the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). While the DCI and the EDF are 
development instruments with a focus on poverty reduction4, the ENI is created to 
help foster stability, security and prosperity in the countries surrounding the EU in 
the East and South (Middle East and Northern Africa, Eastern Europe and the 
Southern Caucasus). The IPA, in turn, is designed to provide support to (potential) 
candidate EU Member States for political, institutional, administrative, social and 
economic reforms to comply with EU policies and standards.
In terms of decision-making and management, the DCI and the EDF are managed 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation 
and Development (DG DEVCO), whereas DG NEAR (Directorate-General for 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations) is responsible for 
the ENI and the IPA. EU Member States also have their say on the implementation 
of these instruments through the so-called ‘comitology procedures’, where a com-
mittee of Member State representatives is engaged before the Commission can 
make decisions on the financing of interventions. 
The added-value of these four instruments in protracted crisis situations lies in that 
they provide a long-term engagement perspective with a focus on capacity-build-
ing, which allows addressing structural vulnerabilities such as weak state institu-
tions or high youth unemployment. A recent illustration was the European Com-
mission’s decision to mobilise EUR 10 million from the IPA to strengthen response 
capacities of countries in the Western Balkans to cope with increased migration 
flows (European Commission, 2015a). In addition to the focus of the EDF and DCI 
4 The EDF provides development aid for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to 
overseas countries and territories. The DCI contains geographic programmes for support in 
developing countries in Latin America, South Asia and North and South East Asia, Central 
Asia, Middle East and South Africa; and thematic programmes for support in all developing 
countries not eligible under the IPA. The DCI also has a Pan-African Programme to support the 
strategic partnership between the EU and Africa.
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on poverty reduction, both instruments have a legal mandate to engage in conflict 
prevention and resolution, state-building and peacebuilding, and post-conflict rec-
onciliation and reconstruction in (post-)crisis or fragile contexts. A good practice in 
this regard is the “Pro-Resilience Action” (PRO-ACT), a programme funded under 
the DCI, focused on resilience-building through long-term crisis prevention and 
(post-)crisis response in countries affected by (protracted) crisis such as South 
Sudan and Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, the use of long-term instruments for protracted crisis remains an 
exception rather than the norm.5 Development instruments function on the basis of 
multi-annual programming documents that identify a set of agreed priorities, and 
are subject to long consultation and contracting procedures that aim to ensure coun-
try ownership, financial accountability and democratic control. Thus the instruments 
are not well-suited for quick and flexible responses in volatile situations, where the 
context of protracted crisis can change rapidly and trigger unexpected needs. The 
instruments’ multi-annual financial and planning outlook can be a disincentive to 
engage in fragile environments, where stability cannot be guaranteed. 
To remedy this, the long-term instruments have a number of provisions that aim at 
making them more flexible and responsive when needed. For example there is an 
option of emergency procedures in crisis situations that allows for quicker deci-
sion-making, e.g. by shortening the consultation process with Member States or 
allowing for direct contracting without calls for proposals. Similarly, a contingency 
fund is available for flexible responses not foreseen in the programming. Despite 
such arrangements, some Commission staff members remain cautious about apply-
ing them due to concerns over transparency and good financial management.6 
Moreover, the high political pressure on development policy to show results and ‘to 
deliver’ actually discourages taking any risks. 
Beyond the traditional humanitarian and development instruments, the EU can 
provide quick and flexible responses to (emerging) crises beyond the humanitarian 
remit through its Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The IcSP 
has global coverage and a broad thematic scope, ranging from peacebuilding and 
mediation, to support to livelihoods and economic recovery, to security sector 
reform and linking up with humanitarian responses. It has, for example, been used 
to support temporary employment programmes in the Gaza Strip, to finance secu-
rity sector reform initiatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or to fund 
demining operations in Syria (to establish humanitarian access in conflict-affected 
zones). As such, the IcSP is a very flexible instrument that allows the EU to engage 
in a very broad range of crisis situations. While the bulk of the resources are used 
5 Interview with NGO representative, 15 April 2016. 
6 Interviews with EU officials.
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for short-term crisis response, nine percent of the total funding is reserved for lon-
ger-term support to peacebuilding, with a focus on civil society. The instrument is 
managed by the European Commission’s service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
(FPI). FPI adopts measures after consultation with the Political and Security Com-
mittee (where EU Member States gather at ambassadorial level), which gives the 
financing decisions a strong political backing. 
In the domain of security, EU Member States have almost fully retained their sover-
eignty, and instruments housed in the European Commission face both legal and 
political limitations to engage in security activities that have a military or defence 
dimension. While the EU provides a framework for civilian and military crisis man-
agement operations (under the so-called ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’), 
such operations require consensus among the 28 Member States, and there is 
limited involvement of the European Commission in their implementation. That 
said, the Commission manages the African Peace Facility (APF), which is funded 
under the EDF, and managed specifically by DG DEVCO. Upon request of the Afri-
can Union or of an African Regional Economic Community, the APF can provide 
support to both short-term Peace Support Operations (representing 90 percent of 
the APF resources, most of which is used for troop stipends to the African Union-
led operation AMISOM in Somalia), and institutional capacity-building to the Afri-
can Peace and Security Architecture7, following the logic of ‘African solutions to 
African problems’. The APF can only provide funding to the AU and the AU Com-
mission, or to African regional organisations. Through the APF, the EU cannot 
engage directly with armed forces at the country level. To fill this gap, the European 
Commission recently proposed to amend the IcSP so it could also provide support 
to the military of countries under certain circumstances (European Commission, 
2016, COM 447 final). Yet this proposal, which is yet to be adopted by the European 
Parliament and the Council at the time of writing, is likely to be both politically and 
legally contentious, as it would extend the European Commission’s influence in the 
security sphere, which is traditionally considered to be within Member States’ 
remit. In addition, it raises concerns over the so-called ‘securitization’ of develop-
ment cooperation funds. 
The most recent innovation in the EU’s portfolio is that the European Commission 
can establish – since the adoption of the 2013 EU Financial regulation (European 
Commission, 2013) – EU Trust Funds to address post-crisis situations. Since the 
7 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) comprises a set of structures and decision-
making processes to implement a comprehensive peace and security agenda in Africa, includ-
ing through early warning and conflict prevention, peace support operations, peacebuilding 
and post-conflict reconstruction. The main pillar of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council, 
which is supported by the African Union Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental 
Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. 
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introduction of this funding mechanism, several EU Trust Funds have been estab-
lished to address the crisis in the Central African Republic (Bêkou Fund), to provide 
a regional response to the Syrian crisis (Madad Fund), and to address the root 
causes of irregular migration in Africa (Emergency Trust Fund for Africa). EU Trust 
Funds bring several advantages. First, they allow the Commission to pool resources 
from different financing instruments under a single management structure. The 
Madad Fund, for example, allows to provide support under one framework in 
Syria’s neighbouring countries, where otherwise three different instruments would 
have to be mobilised separately.8 Second, EU Trust Funds are open for other donors 
to contribute (notably Member States), which allows for donor coordination and 
risk-sharing. Third, because EU Trust Funds have their own decision-making and 
management procedures, with no consultation on financing decisions through 
comitology procedures with all EU Member States or involvement of the European 
Parliament, they allow for a quicker and more flexible response.9 
In summary, the EU has a wide array of funding instruments and mechanisms at its 
disposal. This comprises the ability to provide lifesaving relief to people in urgent 
needs, support stability and security, reduce poverty and promote economic and 
human development, and prevent future crisis or conflict. Overall, it allows the EU 
to address a variety of challenges associated with protracted crises across different 
short- and longer-term time horizons. 
From Theory to Practice: Fragmentation and Policy Incoherence
While the diversity of EU financing instruments and mechanisms allows to develop 
a comprehensive engagement in protracted crises, in practice, it faces several limi-
tations and challenges as instruments do not always succeed in pursuing jointly-
agreed objectives, or they simply fail to link up. This section will explore how the 
institutional and political organisation of the EU, including the dichotomy between 
the EU institutions and the Member States, contributes to a fragmentation of deci-
sion-making and policy incoherence. 
Fragmented Political Leadership and Dispersed Governance of EU Instruments
First and foremost, EU external action is characterised by a fragmented political 
leadership, with different Directorates-General (DGs) in the Commission and dif-
ferent commissioners responsible for development cooperation, humanitarian aid, 
8 The ENI for Lebanon, the IPA for Turkey and the DCI for Iraq.
9 Comitology rules apply for the creation and extension of EU Trust Funds, as well as their liqui-
dation through EU budget resources. Financing decisions taken under the Trust Funds are 
taken in accordance with the Trust Funds’ own decision-making rules (D’Alfonso and Immen-
kamp, 2015). 
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and neighbourhood policy –-although all external action commissioners now regu-
larly meet under the ‘Stronger Global Actor’ project team. Moreover, Member States 
tightly retain their political control over the security domain, which is not properly 
reflected in the governance of Commission-led financing instruments. With different 
instruments managed by separate DGs (DEVCO, NEAR, ECHO and the service 
FPI), coordination requirements are very high, and a coherent mobilisation of instru-
ments in crisis situations cannot always be realised. There is institutional space for 
DGs to simply operate in parallel because of a dispersed system of governance with-
out unified leadership on top. Moreover, the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service, occupies a hybrid position: autonomous from 
the Commission but ‘a service’ and not properly an institution. The EEAS is never-
theless tasked with the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
and supports and coordinates aspects of wider EU external action. 
In addition, EU comprehensiveness cannot ignore the Member States. They help 
shape the responses under the EU instruments (e.g. through comitology consulta-
tions or Trust Fund boards) and as such may bring their own political priorities to 
the table. Moreover, Member States also have their own tools to address protracted 
crises, ranging from development funds to military engagement, and often have 
developed their own versions of a comprehensive approach, with various degrees 
of integration (Hauck and Rocca, 2014). The implementation of the IcSP is a case in 
point of dispersed EU governance, with implementation run in the Commission’s 
FPI and notably counting on staff in EU Delegations (which are part of the EEAS), 
while also involving Member States in the process (through the Political and Secu-
rity Committee). As the IcSP is designed for relatively small, short-term interven-
tions, particular coordination efforts are already required during the design phase 
to ensure a sustainable follow-up by other, more long-term instruments. However, 
evaluations have found out that complementarities with other EU initiatives are 
often missing; the reasons range from the lack of long-term development funding 
available at the right time, to the little attention that the IcSP receives from non-FPI 
staff at the EU Delegations. This reduces the opportunity for coordination and link-
ages so the IcSP can feed into broader EU initiatives in a given country (e.g. Ital-
trend C&T, Office for Economic Policy and Regional Development (EPRD), Social 
Capital Bank, 2014). FPI cannot guarantee coherent follow-up under other instru-
ments either, because these are beyond its control. This illustrates how the EU can 
fail to provide a coherent response to a protracted crisis situation because of the 
fragmented structures and competencies in which decisions are taken.
Strategic (in)Coherence at Regional, Country and Global Levels
In several contexts, the EU has gone to great lengths to develop a coherent strate-
gic framework at regional, country and even global level guiding EU external 
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action, across instruments. Nevertheless, many of these have been important 
efforts ‘in theory’ that face difficulties to actually be put ‘in practice’. The EU 
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is an example of a regional 
EU strategy that has contributed to relevant successes in applying a comprehen-
sive approach in a region marked by recurrent conflict and state fragility. For 
example, the strategy contributed to comprehensiveness by creating mechanisms 
to coordinate between EU stakeholders in response to the Mali crisis that emerged 
in 2012 following the resurgence of the Touareg rebellion and the coup in March 
2012 (Helly and Galeazzi, 2015). Subsequent Regional Action Plans have engaged 
colleagues from both the EEAS and different Commission DGs, which has helped 
build a comprehensive approach in the Sahel, with agreement on certain priori-
ties and identification of instruments to fulfil them. But such a document may 
involve ‘incoherence’ beyond the EU, because ‘the Sahel’ as a region is composed 
of five countries for the EU (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania) and 
leaves out for example Senegal, which is considered ‘Sahelian’ by other interna-
tional actors. Moreover, the Sahel regional strategy is not always aligned with all 
aspects of the EU comprehensive approach. For example, the EU also crafts policy 
in this region with ECOWAS as a strategic interlocutor and recipient, but Chad is 
not part of ECOWAS while the other four countries (together with others in West 
Africa) are. 
The EU has not always been able to reach the successes of the Sahel strategy in 
other regions or countries affected by protracted crises. The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo is an example of insufficient strategy at country level. An evaluation 
recently found that the EU’s Security Sector Reform efforts in the framework of the 
CSDP and later the EDF had only limited impact in the DRC, because they were 
designed ‘from Brussels’ with little knowledge of the country situation, and not 
embedded in a wider strategy that also took into account broader questions of gov-
ernance, inclusion of civil society, human rights protection and accountability of the 
armed forces. The EU’s efforts were also found to be insufficiently combined with 
political dialogue to put pressure on the Congolese government to implement its 
commitments (EurAc, 2016). Having a more comprehensive strategy in place, based 
on a good analysis of the country’s political and conflict context, could have con-
tributed to a more coherent mobilisation of EU instruments, taking into account the 
different interrelated challenges. The EU institutions are establishing cycles and 
documents of ‘joint programming’ and joint assessment in this regard [see section 
4 below], which could serve as a more coherent basis both at broader strategic plan-
ning and field implementation. 
At a global level, a new EU Global Strategy has been presented by the High Repre-
sentative in June 2016, intended to support ‘the materialisation of an EU compre-
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hensive approach’10. This document identifies as EU priorities both the promotion 
of resilience and the need to address all the stages in the conflict cycle (as two out 
of five priorities). While the policy guidance is stated broadly, the prioritisation 
of resilience and a whole-of-cycle view of conflict offer a hook, and a root, for 
applying an EU comprehensive approach when addressing protracted crises, and 
as such provide backing for a more strategically coherent use of EU instruments at 
the country and regional levels. However, it remains to be seen which tools and 
mechanisms will be used to put this document into practice, notably regarding the 
combination of civilian and military EU action. 
Different Policy Communities, Diverging Principles and Incentives
The fragmentation of decision-making and management structures is itself a reflec-
tion of the reality that the various financing instruments serve different objectives 
and constituents. The principles are sometimes in contradiction with each other, 
and with the needs in situations of protracted crisis. For instance, development aid 
follows the principles of local ownership and alignment with country priorities, as 
laid out in the Aid Effectiveness Agenda. The result is that development aid func-
tions on the basis of slow and continuous processes of consultation and dialogue 
with beneficiary countries on programming and financing. This cannot be easily 
reconciled with the need for quick and flexible responses in volatile contexts of 
protracted crisis. These principles are firmly rooted within the development com-
munity’s culture, including the staff at DG DEVCO managing the EU’s develop-
ment instruments. Given DEVCO’s focus on development and poverty reduction, 
the adherence to the Aid Effectiveness principles creates disincentives to prioritise 
crisis-response concerns about quick and flexible action. As a consequence, DEVCO 
staff is often hesitant to use flexibility arrangements even when these are legally 
provided for (e.g. the EU’s emergency procedures mentioned in Section 2).11 
A related question subject to much debate is how to better link humanitarian relief 
with long-term development. The aid effectiveness principles recognise a central 
role for beneficiaries in determining how aid is being used, but this is not always 
easily reconcilable with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence, 
and impartiality, especially when a situation of violent conflict involves govern-
ment authorities. Within the humanitarian community, there are fears that a too-
close integration with the development agenda might risk an instrumentalisation 
of humanitarian aid for strategic or political purposes, which in the worst case 
could put the humanitarian worker in danger if he or she is no longer perceived as 
neutral. The withdrawal of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) from the preparation 
10 Interview with official.
11 Interview with European Commission official, 7 March 2016. 
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process of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, where the issue of better linking 
humanitarian and development aid was a prominent theme on the agenda, is a 
good illustration of the concerns that exist within the humanitarian community 
(Médecins Sans Frontières, 2016).A final illustration of contradicting principles and 
approaches relates to collaboration with local civil society organisations (CSOs). 
While there is increasing recognition at the political level of the importance of 
strengthening civil society in building resilient, inclusive and stable societies,12 sup-
porting CSOs often raises concerns, not only over issues related to sound and trans-
parent financial management, but also over their independence and neutrality in 
situations of (emerging) conflict or political tensions. Such diverging positions can 
have an impact on the extent to which, e.g. humanitarian action can be properly 
linked with actions of a more political nature.
In general, the institutional fragmentation at EU-level is both a reflection of, and 
a contributor to thinking in silos, where different professional mandates and 
incentives across institutions pose serious constraints to the creation of a shared 
understanding and more coherent responses to protracted crises. 
Overlapping Mandates and Functions Across New Instruments
A final critique relates to the positioning of the IcSP and the Trust Funds in the 
overall EU crisis response system, as examples of instruments that seek to cover 
some gaps but may have negative ‘side-effects’, such as overlap, reduced account-
ability, and blurry political lines. As the Commission has the exclusive responsi- 
bility among EU institutions for managing operational funding under the EU 
budget, it is the Commission, through FPI, who has financial authority over the 
IcSP. At the same time, FPI is physically housed within the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) premises, which facilitates EEAS involvement in the prepa-
ration and implementation of this essentially political instrument. 
This hybrid position of the IcSP leads to different interpretations on the ultimate 
nature and purpose of the instrument. Some within the EU institutions view the 
IcSP as an auxiliary instrument available to the EEAS and the Political and Security 
Committee (officially, a body within the Council of the EU) to respond to urgent 
political requests in crisis situations, independently from what other instruments 
are doing. Others, however, rather stress the function of the IcSP in filling gaps 
where other EU (development) instruments are not (yet) mobilised and pave the 
way to longer-term development engagements. The broad mandate and the flexi-
bility of this instrument can have advantages, but it risks not being optimally used 
12 See e.g. the discussion on the localisation of humanitarian aid, United Nations, 2016. One 
humanity: shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit. 
UNGA Seventieth session. 
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in the absence of a clear political priority-setting and fragmented leadership on EU 
external action.
Finally, the establishment of the EU Trust Funds risks creating overlaps in man-
dates with other instruments. This is particularly the case for the IcSP, which also 
has a focus on emergency response extending into the security-development nexus 
sphere (even if Trust Funds have a country or regional scope, whereas the IcSP can 
be used worldwide). While a degree of thematic overlap is not problematic per se 
(as it gives some flexibility in where to mobilise resources), it does raise questions 
on how to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity. Given that the IcSP has 
political backing from all Member States at ambassadorial level through the Politi-
cal and Security Committee, it has a strong political basis. By contrast, the EU Trust 
Funds have less political foundation, and are not agreed by all EU Member States. 
Despite drawing significantly on EU budget resources, decisions under the EU 
Trust Funds are not subject to the regular Member State consultation processes 
(comitology) that apply to the EU financing instruments otherwise. Instead, only 
donors (next to the European Commission) that have directly contributed a mini-
mum of EUR 3 million to the Trust Fund (in addition to the EU contributions) have 
a vote in the Trust Funds Boards and Operational Committees, and can therefore 
decide on the overall strategy and financing measures. This gives a say to Trust 
Fund-contributing countries and to the Commission, whereas EU countries not 
contributing to the Fund are left out. Moreover, the creation and management of EU 
Trust Funds are not based on a democratic debate in the European Parliament, and 
the role that the EEAS plays in taking decisions (beyond its representation in the 
Trust Fund Committees) remains rather unclear. Finally, partner country govern-
ments are involved in decision-making to varying degrees. In the case of the Bêkou 
Fund, the transitional government of the Central African Republic was involved in 
the creation of the Trust Fund, and while they have no formal voting rights in the 
Board, they are fully consulted for major decisions. The Madad Fund, however, 
does not involve partner countries’ governments in decision-making and program-
ming, with implications for ownership (Hauck, Knoll and Cangas, 2015). Neverthe-
less, EU Trust Funds are still relatively new, and there is limited information avail-
able on how they relate to other instruments (such as the IcSP) in practice. How 
they could potentially be further delineated is an area that clearly requires further 
attention.
To sum up, this section has revealed that, despite the wide variety of instruments, 
the EU faces certain limitations and challenges in establishing a comprehensive 
response to protracted crises. The main risks in going ‘from theory to practice’ 
remain fragmentation and incoherence in EU policy-making, which is reflected in 
– and also fed by – the financial instruments. In fact, the instruments are so central 
to EU policy-making that they sometimes drive policy as ‘enablers’ of EU action, 
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while they should instead be driven by political leadership. But as this section has 
argued, this is sometimes disperse, contradictory, or even missing. 
Reaching Comprehensiveness in a Complex World
The EU has made serious efforts to establish and improve comprehensiveness in its 
instrument-driven approach to protracted crises and overcome the associated limi-
tations. Nevertheless, there are clear challenges to making the EU external action 
more comprehensive, as we highlight in this section. 
There have been attempts to improve comprehensiveness at the highest political 
level. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, introduced the 
post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose mandate 
includes ensuring the consistency of EU external action, a task in which he or she is 
supported by the EEAS. The High Representative (a post currently held by Ms Fed-
erica Mogherini) also serves as Vice-President of the European Commission and, in 
that capacity, chairs the project team ‘A Stronger Global Actor’, which provides a 
forum to the different European commissioners that have portfolios related to EU 
external action to coordinate their activities. However, the project team has only 
recently been established (when the Juncker Commission entered office in 2014), 
and there is so far little evidence available as to how it successfully contributes to 
more political leadership and comprehensive action. 
High Representative Mogherini has also taken the lead over the preparation of a 
‘Global Strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy (European Union, 2016), as 
mentioned above. This document replaces the 2003 European Security Strategy, but 
takes a much wider scope by providing guidance for all dimensions of EU external 
action, including by formulating an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. As 
such, the document, which was welcomed during the European Council meeting in 
June 2016, provides a potentially useful framework for a more comprehensive 
engagement in crisis situations. It remains to be seen to what extent it will enjoy 
political sponsorship across the EU institutions, and whether a follow-up sectorial 
document on security and defence would offer more hints as to how the EU could 
address protracted crisis. 
Within the EU system, both formal coordination and information exchange mecha-
nisms have been set up to foster collective responses to crisis situations. This nota-
bly includes the establishment of the EEAS Crisis Response System. When acti-
vated, it allows the EEAS to convene on an ad hoc basis so-called Crisis Platforms to 
coordinate amongst a range of relevant bodies across the EU system on political 
and strategic matters in response to a particular crisis. However, while the Crisis 
Platforms aim to improve comprehensiveness, they have in some cases themselves 
fell victim to the fragmentation of the EU system. For instance, DG ECHO, the EU’s 
humanitarian aid and civil protection office, manages its own Emergency Response 
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Coordination Centre, acting as the operational coordination hub of the EU civil 
protection mechanism for responses in- or outside Europe. A similar example 
regards the EU Trust Funds, which also have a role in coordinating EU efforts, with 
the Commission taking the lead. Without proper political guidance and leadership, 
this proliferation of parallel coordination bodies risks duplicating efforts and even 
creating turf wars, rather than solving them. 
Despite such formal coordination mechanisms, a high degree of information 
exchange and coordination also happens through informal contacts. While this 
makes effective coordination dependent on good personal relations among staff 
members, it has the benefit of allowing some flexibility and swiftness, which is 
particularly valued in crisis situations. Indeed, while a certain systematisation of 
coordination and information exchange are needed, the EU must also avoid over-
bureaucratising the processes to allow for meaningful dialogues across the institu-
tions. 
At country level, the EU aims to foster EU-wide strategising and programming. 
The concept of ‘EU Joint Framework Documents’ (JFD) is a case in point. JFDs are 
strategic documents that aim to integrate all dimensions of EU external action and 
outline EU interests and priorities in given countries or regions. These then provide 
a solid basis for better aligned programming of the various EU instruments in a 
country or region. However, research has found that JFDs in the past tended to 
focus more on short-term crisis management priorities, rather than on longer-term 
development objectives, and therefore failed to provide a useful basis for the pro-
gramming of all EU instruments so that they would be able to address the various 
dimensions of (protracted) crisis in a more comprehensive way (Herrero, Knoll, 
Gregersen and Kokolo, 2015). Nevertheless, as Herrero et al. note, they may still 
shape a promising avenue in more coherent programming exercises in protracted 
crisis situations in the future, provided that the JFDs formulate a perspective 
beyond the short-term political, economic and security interests of the EU. 
In a similar vein, the European Commission has provided guidance for the devel-
opment of Joint Humanitarian-Development Frameworks (JHDFs) to guide transi-
tion processes out of crisis situations (Ramet, 2012). JHDFs have the aim of integrat-
ing different EU interventions across the crisis cycle, with involvement of ECHO, 
FPI, DEVCO and the EEAS, as well as Member States to jointly engage in conflict 
analysis and coordinate activities. JHDFs offer a light and flexible coordination tool, 
but there is currently no clarity on the leadership over JHDF processes, leaving the 
development and use of such frameworks dependent on individual initiatives.13
Beyond immediate crisis situations, Joint Programming has been used by EU insti-
tutions and Member States as a process to jointly determine a development response 
13 Interview with European Commission official, 11 March 2016. 
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for a particular partner country. This could particularly be beneficial in fragile con-
texts, and has already been successfully applied in volatile countries such as South 
Sudan, Haiti or Mali to better harmonise EU and Member States efforts at pro- 
moting development and reducing poverty and hunger in environments where 
state capacities are weak (Helly, Galeazzi, Parshotam, Gregersen, Kokolo and Sher-
riff, 2015). An important issue in protracted crises relates to ensuring that EU inter-
ventions across the crisis cycle take into account local political and conflict dynam-
ics. Therefore, several EU bodies have established expertise hubs on conflict and 
crisis that are tasked with expanding the EU’s understanding of conflict and that 
promote the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity. Following the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile 
States and Situations, DG DEVCO established a Fragility and Crisis Management 
Unit (recently rebranded as Fragility and Resilience Unit). The institutional coun-
terpart to this Unit in the EEAS, is the Conflict prevention, Peacebuilding and 
Mediation Division (also known as SECPOL 2), which provides expertise for engag-
ing in conflict-affected situations. SECPOL 2 also facilitates early warning across 
EU institutions, allowing for regular reassessments of crisis situations to inform 
longer-term outlooks to (post-)crisis situations. The DEVCO Fragility Unit and 
SECPOL 2 (then still known as the K2 Division) have collaborated on the develop-
ment of a joint conflict assessment guidance. More recently, the Fragility Unit has 
developed guidance on conflict-sensitivity in EU interventions and sought to 
ensure coherence between EU instruments and policies when engaging in fragile 
and crisis-hit situations. The Unit also leads training workshops on conflict- and 
fragility-related topics for EU staff across the system. 
While such tools are valued, strong guidance and direction on how and when to 
use them is often missions, and the extent to which they influence implementation 
still depends on individual commitments of staff members and leadership in other 
DGs and EEAS Divisions. Consequently, this only resolves differences in mandates 
and biases among EU bodies to a limited extent. Other measures to boost crisis- and 
conflict-related expertise could involve increasing staff mobility across DGs and 
creating knowledge management and information-exchange tools shared by the 
Commission, the EEAS (including EU Delegations) and CSDP missions at Brussels 
level and in the field (Anthony and Lundin, 2015). The EU Delegations constitute 
indeed a crucial strategic asset to achieve comprehensiveness on the ground. As 
representations of the Union as a whole (rather than single EU institutions)14, Del-
egations can act as a local coordinator between EU bodies and Member States in a 
given country or crisis situation, including in programming and implementation 
14 EU Delegations representing the whole Union were introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. They 
replaced the former European Commission Delegations, which had a less political mandate. 
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processes (Helly, Herrero, Knoll, Galeazzi and Sherriff, 2014). Furthermore, Delega-
tions now also have responsibilities in the field of peace and security (Helly and 
Galeazzi, 2014). Especially the political sections of the Delegations can play an 
important role in feeding knowledge on a country’s political and security situation 
in development instrument strategies and programming, thus promoting a more 
context-driven and conflict-sensitive approach. However, limited expertise and 
resources available to EU Delegations have limited the extent to which they can 
perform such tasks (European Union External Action, 2013). Much also depends on 
the personality of the Head of Delegation and how he or she views his or her role 
in promoting a culture of collaboration and comprehensiveness across the Union 
through regular engagement with other EU actors in the field (e.g. by inviting 
Heads of ECHO field offices to the weekly coordination meetings at the Delega-
tions). 
In sum, progress has been made in providing solutions to improve comprehen-
siveness in the complex institutional environment of the EU. Steps have been 
made through a harmonisation of concepts and strategies and through the cre-
ation of mechanisms for coordination and information exchange at both the polit-
ical and operational levels. These efforts have often proven promising avenues 
towards more comprehensiveness and could be used more systematically. How-
ever, such technical solutions for coordination and comprehensiveness will con-
tinue to face limitations in the absence of clear political guidance bringing all 
pieces together. 
Concluding Remarks 
The EU is a complex environment, with many institutions and 28 Member States 
involved. The EU institutions have a diverse set of instruments and mechanisms 
available that allow it to simultaneously address the many challenges associated 
with protracted crises, including saving lives, ending conflict, restoring peace and 
security, reducing poverty and hunger and preventing future crises. However, the 
financing instruments designed to achieve these goals are fragmented and do not 
always complement each other. This is a reflection of the EU institutional environ-
ment, and of the procedures and the politics in this environment. In such a context, 
it has been acknowledged that a comprehensive approach was needed: much has 
been done to harmonize concepts and strategies, and it is already being imple-
mented (to a certain degree). There have been serious efforts to improve compre-
hensiveness in EU responses to protracted crises, although these remain subopti-
mal or underexplored due to the absence of clear EU political leadership. 
Moreover, we would emphasise that coordination and coherence are not an end in 
themselves, but a means for the EU to address the real challenges of humanitarian 
and protracted crisis, and of peace and economic development in the long term. 
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The comprehensive approach itself is a tool at the service of the goals, to achieve 
more united EU external action and more impact. As an institution, the EU invests 
much energy and resources in coordination, yet it is important that it does not get 
lost in the process and continues to focus on the goals.
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